TRUSTED® COMPUTING GROUP

SPECIFICATION

Canonical Event Log Format

Version: 1.1
Publication Date: 25/10/09

Contact: admin@trustedcomputinggroup.org

PUBLISHED

© TCG 2025

THIS SPECIFICATION IS PROVIDED “AS IS” WITH NO WARRANTIES WHATSOEVER, INCLUDING ANY WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, NONINFRINGEMENT, FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR ANY WARRANTY OTHERWISE ARISING OUT OF ANY PROPOSAL, SPECIFICATION OR SAMPLE.

Without limitation, TCG disclaims all liability, including liability for infringement of any proprietary rights, relating to use of information in this specification and to the implementation of this specification, and TCG disclaims all liability for cost of procurement of substitute goods or services, lost profits, loss of use, loss of data or any incidental, consequential, direct, indirect, or special damages, whether under contract, tort, warranty or otherwise, arising in any way out of use or reliance upon this specification or any information herein.

This document is copyrighted by Trusted Computing Group (TCG), and no license, express or implied, is granted herein other than as follows: You may not copy or reproduce the document or distribute it to others without written permission from TCG, except that you may freely do so for the purposes of (a) examining or implementing TCG specifications or (b) developing, testing, or promoting information technology standards and best practices, so long as you distribute the document with these disclaimers, notices, and license terms.

Contact the Trusted Computing Group at www.trustedcomputinggroup.org for information on specification licensing through membership agreements.

Any marks and brands contained herein are the property of their respective owners.

 © TCG 2025

CHANGE HISTORY

REVISION	DATE	DESCRIPTION
1.00/41	Feb 25, 2022	• Initial Release
1.1/1	November 28, 2023	• Add SYSTEMD content type
1.1/2	November 29, 2023	• Incorporate 1.0 Errata
1.1/3	December 6, 2023	• Incorporated combined JSON/CBOR CDDL specification
1.1/4	January 10, 2024	• Minor cleanups
1.1/5	January 21, 2024	• Minor corrections to JSON labels
1.1/6	January 30, 2024	• Fixed Minor typos
1.1/7	February 2, 2024	• Removed obsolete comment in CDDL section
1.1/8	April 9, 2024	• Clarifications to informative text
1.1/9	May 24, 2024	• Minor edits
1.1/10	October 9, 2024	• Minor Edits
1.1/11	October 9 2025	• Minor edits

 © TCG 2025

Contents

DISCLAIMERS, NOTICES, AND LICENSE TERMS 0
CHANGE HISTORY 2
1 Background and Scope 5
1.1 Background 5
1.2 Scope 6
2 Document Style 7
2.1 Key Words 7
2.2 Statement Type 7
3 References and Terms 8
3.1 References 8
3.2 Terms 8
3.2.1 Native Event Log Record (NELR) 8
3.2.2 Canonical Event Log (CEL) 8
3.2.3 Canonical Event Log Record (CELR) 8
3.2.4 Canonical Event Log Information Model (CEL-IM) 8
3.2.5 Canonical Event Log Encoding (CEL-EN) 8
3.2.6 Event Log Critical Data (ELCD) 8
3.2.7 Event Log Informative Data (ELID) 9
3.2.8 Content Type Custodian 9
4 Canonical Event Log Information Model (CEL-IM) 10
4.1 Canonical Event Log (CEL) Definition 10
4.2 Canonical Event Log Record (CELR) Definition 10
4.2.1 CELR General Requirements 10
4.2.2 Record Number Field 10
4.2.3 Record PCR or NV Index Field 10
4.2.4 Record Digest Field 10
4.2.5 Record Event Content Field 11
4.3 CELR data type definitions 11
4.4 CEL Management Event Types 12
4.4.1 CEL Version 13
4.4.2 Firmware End 13
4.4.3 CEL Timestamp 13
4.4.4 State Trans 13
4.5 PCCLIENT_STD Event Types 14
4.6 IMA_TEMPLATE Event Types 14

 © TCG 2025

4.7 IMA_TLV Event Types 14
4.8 SYSTEMD Event Type 14
5 Canonical Event Log Encodings (CEL-EN) 15
5.1 Canonical Event Log Record Encoding – TLV (CEL-TLV) 15
5.1.1 CEL_RECNUM TLV 16
5.1.2 CEL_PCR_NVINDEX TLV 16
5.1.3 CEL_DIGESTS TLV 16
5.1.4 CEL_CONTENT TLV 17
5.1.5 IMA_TLV Content Layer 17
5.1.6 IMA_TEMPLATE Content Layer 19
5.1.7 PCCLIENT_STD Content Layer 21
5.1.8 CEL_MGT Content Layer 24
5.1.9 SYSTEMD Content Layer 24
5.2 Canonical Event Log Encoding – CDDL 25
6 Defined types for all examples. 29

 © TCG 2025

1 Background and Scope

Attestation is the process of reporting a platform's operational state. During boot, and optionally during continued operation, the platform executes components that may impact the trustworthiness of its operational state. To support Attestation, the identity or state of each of these components is recorded such that those identities or states can be reported as authentic (i.e., they are from the expected platform and are integrity protected). This process is called Measurement. When using the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [1], the measurement process uses the TPM's Extend[1] operation. Device Identifier Composition Engine (DICE [6]) has similar operations[2]. While this document uses definitions from the TPM Specification [1] extensively, it is applicable to any Root of Trust for Measurement or Attestation.

A Measurement at a minimum represents an Event operation with one of the Event Types as specified in Section 4.3. This results in the Attestation of an accumulated platform state at a particular point, but there is no visibility into the individual components comprising that point or state. A particular Measurement may record information about the component being measured or its related data. This type of measurement is called an Event Log Record. The collection of the Event Log Records is an Event Log.

The Extend operation provides evidence of the integrity of a measurement. The Event Log may be stored in insecure locations. Authenticity of the Event Log is performed using a Quote operation[3].

1.1 Background

Different platform classes and even different processes with a single platform class may create Event Log Records in different formats and may store them in different locations. The PC Client, for example, uses a format [2] defined by TCG that is optimized for that platform's firmware, and stores Events in platform specific ACPI (Advanced Configuration and Power Interface) memory [7]. Linux bootloaders typically store Events in the PC Client log, but the contents of the Events are not specified by the PC Client document [2]. IMA (Integrity Measurement Architecture)[5] has a flexible "Template" format, and the Event Log is stored in the Linux Kernel memory space. SYSTEMD [9] stores its Events in its journal database, stored on the root filesystem. Full verification of a platform's state requires collecting all Events from all of these locations in all of these formats. As an attacker may be able to send altered or even malicious Event Log data to the Verifier, the Verifier must be very careful in its parsing and verification of the Event Log data. A Verifier could be much simpler and more robust if the Event Log data were already collected and encapsulated in a common format.

Secondly, verification is more robust if Event Log data is explicitly ordered to detect missing or out of order Events. Rather than put serialization information within each record, the PC Client Event Log Record format is implicitly ordered by requiring Event Log Records to be sequential in memory to preserve the sequence of the measurements performed using the Extend operations. This is acceptable for firmware because there are a finite number of measurements during the boot process. Once the platform's Operating System starts, the firmware stops execution and ceases to create measurements. These limited number of Event Log Records can be captured leaving storage, transmission, and serialization, if needed, to higher layers later in the boot process.

Even within the same platform class, when the firmware completes and stops performing measurements, the Operating System may use IMA to measure runtime events such as the execution of applications. Systemd may make its own measurements during boot and the startup of system services. Another significant difference from a firmware measurement is that the Operating System measurement may be continuous, creating more Event Log Records than can be efficiently stored on the platform. The Event Log Records may, therefore, need to be exported from the

[1] Several TPM commands support the Extend operation. Examples are TPM2_PCR_Extend, TPM2_PCR_Event, the TPM2_EventSequenceComplete, and even the TPM 1.2 TPM_Extend. For the purpose of this specification, these are equivalent and are collectively called the Extend operation (Note the use of capitalization to distinguish this specific operation.)

[2] DICE performs a similar operation to Extend by performing a series of hashes over its boot components. This operation is also included in the general term Extend used in this specification.

[3] This specification will use the term Quote operation as a general term for the proof of an Attestation such as a series of measurements. A Quote may be performed using the TPM2_PCR_Quote command but other methods are available such as a TPM2_PCR_Read within an Audit Session.

 © TCG 2025

originating platform to an external storage location. As the transmission and storage system may not reliably maintain an Event Log Record sequence, each Event Log Record contains a unique sequential index number. Embedding explicit sequence information within each Event Log Record enables tracking of Event Log Records that have been moved or deleted from their originating platform, enables efficient transmission from host to host, and simplifies the work of the Verifier.

1.2 Scope

This document specifies a Common Event Log Format. Note that this Common Event Log Format is not a replacement for the existing Event Log formats defined by Content Type Custodians (see section 3.2.8 Content Type Custodian) such as PC Client, IMA, and Systemd. This Common Event Log Format specifies the encapsulation of these external Content Types to provide a common input to a Verifier.

This specification for the Canonical Event Log covers three layers: a single top-level Information Model, possibly multiple encoding layers, and multiple content layers. This specification provides a single information model for representing a Canonical Event Log Record that can encapsulate native Event Log Records from various sources. This specification also provides a simple Type-Length-Value (TLV) encoding, a Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) encoding, and a JSON encoding. Multiple encoding formats are included to handle diverse use cases, with different tradeoffs between size, robustness, and readability.

This specification covers encapsulation of some content layers, including CEL Management, PCCLIENT [2] and IMA [5] content. While a content layer implementation may choose to create an exact binary mapping to this information model as its native Event Log Record, other implementations may choose to bind this information model to other formats, such as TLV or CBOR.

As an information model, this specification's normative statements pertain to the type of information which must be included in any encoding layer format. This specification also normatively states the TLV encoding layer and CBOR encoding layers that may be used. It also informatively describes JSON encoding, as specified in "TCG TSS 2.0 JSON Data Types and Policy Language Specification" [8], to provide comprehensive examples of Event encodings across all TCG specified encodings.

 © TCG 2025

2 Document Style

2.1 Key Words

The key words “MUST,” “MUST NOT,” “REQUIRED,” “SHALL,” “SHALL NOT,” “SHOULD,” “SHOULD NOT,” “RECOMMENDED,” “MAY,” and “OPTIONAL” in this document’s normative statements are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119, Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels.

2.2 Statement Type

Please note an important distinction between different sections of text throughout this document. There are two distinctive kinds of text: informative comment and normative statements. Because most of the text in this specification will be of the kind normative statements, the authors have informally defined it as the default and, as such, have specifically called out text of the kind informative comment. They have done this by flagging the beginning and end of each informative comment and highlighting its text in gray. This means that unless text is specifically marked as of the kind informative comment, it can be considered a kind of normative statement.

EXAMPLE: ***Start of informative comment***

This is the first paragraph of 1–n paragraphs containing text of the kind *informative comment* ...

This is the second paragraph of text of the kind *informative comment* ...

This is the nth paragraph of text of the kind *informative comment* ...

To understand the TCG specification the user must read the specification. (This use of MUST does not require any action).

End of informative comment

 © TCG 2025

3 References and Terms

3.1 References

[1] "Trusted Platform Module Library Family 2.0 Level 00 Revision 01.59, https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-library-specification/

[2] "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification"; Family "2.0" Level 00 Revision 1.04 June 3, 2019, https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/pc-client-specific-platform-firmware-profile-specification/

[3] "TCG Algorithm Registry, Family "2.0", Level 00 Revision 01.24 January 25, 2017 https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tcg-algorithm-registry/

[4] "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Integrity Measurement Specification"; Version 0.15 March 31, 2020, https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG_PC_Client_FIM_v1_r40_02dec2020.pdf

[5] Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA), Part of the official Linux Kernel, http://kernel.org

[6] Dice Architecture: https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/work-groups/dice-architectures/

[7] Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI) Specification, Version 6.3, January 2019, https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/ACPI_6_3_final_Jan30.pdf

[8] "TCG TSS 2.0 JSON Data Types and Policy Language Specification", June 11, 2020, https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TSS_JSON_Policy_v0p7_r08_pub.pdf

[9] Systemd, https://github.com/systemd/systemd

3.2 Terms

Start of informative comment

3.2.1 Native Event Log Record (NELR)

This is an Event Log formatted by the native environment that produced the measurement. This may be a TCG standard (e.g., as defined by the PC Client Platform Specification [2]) or may be a de-facto standard, such as produced by bootloaders and operating systems.

3.2.2 Canonical Event Log (CEL)

The CEL consists of one or more Canonical Event Log Records.

3.2.3 Canonical Event Log Record (CELR)

An Event Log Record, irrespective of the data representation format, which meets the CEL mandatory requirements. A complete record containing required information for the Verifier to verify the integrity of the information in the Event Log Record and the information needed to assess a platform's trustworthiness. A reference to an Event Log Record does not imply any particular format. For example, a PC Client's Event Log [2] is a complete Event Log Record because it contains the information needed to verify the Event Log information, including the PCR number and the implicit sequence number (that is indicated by the record's position within the allocated memory). A CELR also contains the critical data needed by the Verifier to determine a platform's trustworthiness

3.2.4 Canonical Event Log Information Model (CEL-IM)

A specification of the data that must be contained in a CELR, irrespective of Encoding.

3.2.5 Canonical Event Log Encoding (CEL-EN)

A specific data format to meet to the CEL requirements. This may be TLV, CBOR, or a simple binary format.

3.2.6 Event Log Critical Data (ELCD)

This is information required by the Verifier to either verify the integrity of the Event Log Record or information used by the Verifier to determine a platform's trustworthiness. A sequence number is an example of Critical Data required to verify to the integrity of the Event Log Record. The Verifier must process the series of Event Log Records in the order they were measured. Another example of ELCD is the PCR number.

 © TCG 2025

3.2.7 Event Log Informative Data (ELID)

This is information that is helpful to the Verifier but is not measured. Using the PC Client PFP [2] as an example, while the actual hash of a firmware component that is Extended is Event Log Critical Data, the Event Log Record may contain other information such as a string representing firmware's source and version information that may assist in verification. In this example, if a Platform has had several firmware updates, the Verifier may use this Event Log Informative Data to lookup (or request) the expected measured value.

3.2.8 Content Type Custodian

The Content Type Custodian is the entity responsible for the specification of external Event Types and their contents. Examples include PC Client [2], IMA [5], and Systemd [9].

End of informative comment

 © TCG 2025

4 Canonical Event Log Information Model (CEL-IM)

4.1 Canonical Event Log (CEL) Definition

A Canonical Event Log SHALL consist of a list of Canonical Event Log Records (CELR).

4.2 Canonical Event Log Record (CELR) Definition

A Canonical Event Log Record SHALL consist of four fields: a record number, a PCR or NV Index number, a digest field (that can contain multiple digests for selected banks), and a content field.

4.2.1 CELR General Requirements

4.2.1.1 Maintenance of the Measurement Integrity

A Verifier MUST be able to verify the integrity of all Event Log Critical Data (ELCD) whether the ELCD was generated directly into CELR or whether a utility transformed a Native Event Log Record (NELR) into a CELR.

4.2.1.2 Event Log Critical Data

A Canonical Event Log Record (CELR) MUST contain all information from the original entity that created the measurement. If the CELR is created by transforming a Native Event Log Record (NELR), the transformation MUST allow the Verifier to verify the integrity of the resulting CELR using information from the TPM Quote Operation. Note that the conversion from NELR to CELR could produce more information in the CELR than was in the original NELR. For example, the CELR can contain an explicit sequence number when the NELR contained only an implicit one.

4.2.2 Record Number Field

This identifies the sequence of the CELR within a set of measurements. The Value Element is the sequence number represented as an unsigned integer.

The RECNUM value SHALL:

1. Start at zero. For example, if using a TPM, set RECNUM to zero at TPM2_Startup (CLEAR).
2. Monotonically increment with each Event Log Record.
3. Be maintained separately per index, in the case of a log with records for multiple different PCR or NV indices. (For example, IMA is authoritative only over its PCR (i.e., 10) and need not coordinate RECNUM with other PCRs.)
4. Increment regardless of whether the Event is measured or unmeasured, because that enables a Verifier to detect missing Events and unmeasured Events.

4.2.3 Record PCR or NV Index Field

This field indicates which PCR or NV Index was associated with the event. Note that some events are unmeasured, and do not affect the indicated PCR. As a measurement can Extend only one PCR or NV index, there is no rationale for this field being represented as a bitmap (i.e., TPMS_PCR_SELECTION). The field, therefore, SHALL be the integer representation of the PCR or NV index.

4.2.4 Record Digest Field

This field contains the list of the digest values Extended. The Extend method varies with TPM command, so there is no uniform meaning of TPM Extend in this instance, and separate descriptions are unavoidable. If using the TPM2_PCR_Extend command, this field is the data sent to the TPM (i.e., not the resulting value of the PCR after the TPM2_PCR_Extend command completes). Typically, this data sent to the TPM is the hash of the underlying data being measured, not the raw data of the event itself. If using the TPM2_PCR_Event command, this field contains the digest structure returned by the TPM2_PCR_Event command (that contains the digest(s) submitted to each PCR bank as the internal Extend operation). This field SHALL contain the information from the TPML_DIGEST_VALUES used in the Extend operation. (Exactly how this information is encoded will be described in the selected encoding layer).

 © TCG 2025

4.2.5 Record Event Content Field

This field contains both the Event Log Critical Data (ELCD) and Event Log Informative Data (ELID) as defined by the Content Type Custodian. This specification (CEL) defines the values identifying the Content Type Custodian but the information within the Event Content Value field is entirely defined by the Content Type Custodian.

Note that there are one or more Content Types assigned to the CEL. These are typically management Events or determined to be common across all Content Type domains, so they are defined as part of this specification.

The Content Type Custodian defines what components of the Event Content are hashed to create the Extend value. These components are likely the entire set of Event Log Critical Data (ELCD), but Event Log Informative Data (ELID) MAY be included.

If multiple PCR Banks are Extended, the same method SHALL be used for deriving each PCR Bank's digest.

4.3 CELR data type definitions

The data type in Table 1 defines the CELR data type TPMS_CEL_EVENT. If a numeric representation is required for the specific encoding (such as binary or TLV) then the values from the column "value" SHALL be used. (Again, this Information Model specifies the data content, not the encoded format.) The format follows that of the TCG TPM Library Specification Part 2 [1].

Table 1 TPMS_CEL_EVENT

DATA TYPE	FIELD NAME	VALUE	DESCRIPTION
Unsigned Integer	recnum	0	Unique Record Number
TPMI_DH_PCR	pcr	1	PCR index
TPMI_DH_NV_INDEX	nv_index	2	NV Index
TPML_DIGEST_VALUES	digests	3	Digests Extended
TPMI_CEL_CONTENT_TYPE	content_type	See Table 2	
TPMU_EVENT_CONTENT	content	CONTENT_TYPE	The event data for this CELR

Note that TPML_DIGEST_VALUES (specified in the TPM Library Specification[1]) is a complex structure, including variable length arrays of structures. This information model specifies only that the contents and ordinals from TPML_DIGEST_VALUES be used and does not specify how they are encoded. Section 5.1 shows how this may be encoded using TLV.

Also note that "content_type" is an optional field that can be used if the encoding lists the content type separately before the content field itself. The "content_type" fields are used by JSON and CBOR encodings. TLV encodings incorporate the content type within the "content" field as described in section 5.

The enumeration in Table 2 defines the supported content types. If a numeric representation is required for the specific encoding (such as binary or TLV) then the values from the column "value" SHALL be used.

Table 2 TPMI_CEL_CONTENT_TYPE

NAME	VALUE	DESCRIPTION
cel	4	CEL management; Content managed by TCG / CEL
pcclient_std	5	PC Client WG defined encapsulated structure
-	6	reserved
ima_template	7	Linux-IMA TEMPLATE format
ima_tlv	8	Linux-IMA TLV format
systemd	9	Linux systemd events
-	10	reserved

 © TCG 2025

Table 3 defines the supported content fields.

Table 3 TPMU_EVENT_CONTENT

DATA TYPE	FIELD	SELECTOR	DESCRIPTION
TPMS_EVENT_CELMGT	celmgt	cel	CEL management; Content managed by TCG / CEL
TPMS_EVENT_PCCLIENT_STD	pcclient_std	pcclient_std	PC Client WG defined encapsulated structure
TPMS_EVENT_IMA_TEMPLATE	ima_template	ima_template	Linux-IMA TEMPLATE format
IMA_TLV	ima_tlv	ima_tlv	Linux-IMA TLV format
SYSTEMD	systemd	systemd	Linux Systemd Event

The IMA_TLV content is specified in IMA [5]. Informative examples are included in section 5.

4.4 CEL Management Event Types

A CEL Management Event consists of a type and depending on the type it might contain additional information. Some of these Events are measured into a PCR whilst others are not. This is denoted accordingly in sections 4.4.1 through 4.4.4.

Table 4 defines the content of a CEL Management Event TPMS_EVENT_CELMGT.

Table 4 TPMS_EVENT_CELMGT

TYPE	FIELD	VALUE	DESCRIPTION
TPMI_CELMGTTYPE	type	0	The type of CEL event
TPMU_CELMGT	data	1	The data of this CEL event

The VALUE column in Table 5 defines the types of CEL Management Events TPMI_CELMGTTYPE.

Table 5 TPMI_CELMGTTYPE

NAME	VALUE	DESCRIPTION
cel_version	1	Identifies the CEL specification version (Not measured into PCR)
firmware_end	2	End of firmware events (Not measured into PCR)
cel_timestamp	80	Provides a timestamp (Measured into PCR)
State_trans	81	Identifies a platform state transition (e.g., hibernation) (Measured into PCR)

 © TCG 2025

Table 6 defines the CEL Management Event content TPMU_CELMGT. The referenced types stem from the TPM Library Specification Part 2 (TPMS_EMPTY) or are defined in the following sections.

Table 6 TPMU_CELMGT

TYPE	FIELD	SELECTOR	DESCRIPTION
TPMS_CEL_VERSION	cel_version	cel_version	Identifies the CEL specification version
TPMS_EMPTY	firmware_end	firmware_end	End of firmware events This event contains no further data, thus TPMS_EMPTY is matched for the union.
UINT64	cel_timestamp	cel_timestamp	Provides a timestamp as UTC time, in Linux seconds from the epoch format.
TPMI_STATE_TRANS	state_trans	state_trans	Identifies a platform state transition

4.4.1 CEL Version

This Event Content Value Element identifies the specification version this Event Log adheres to. Table 7 defines the corresponding data types for TPMS_CEL_VERSION.

Table 7 TPMS_CEL_VERSION

TYPE	FIELD	VALUE	DESCRIPTION
UINT16	major	0	Major version (currently 1)
UINT16	minor	1	Minor version (currently .0)

This Event SHALL NOT be measured but is included for informational purposes.

4.4.2 Firmware End

This Event Content Value Element marks the end of the device's firmware boot phase and the start of the OS / operational phase. It does not contain any further information. This Element is intended as a convenience only to allow coordinating systems to distinguish between firmware and post-firmware measurements.

4.4.3 CEL Timestamp

This Event Content Value Element contains a timestamp that was Extended.

The data SHALL be encoded as UINT64 representing the milliseconds since time-origin (value = 0) according to the Coordinated Universal Time (UTC).

4.4.4 State Trans

This Event Content Value Element contains the device's state transition. State transitions are platform specific. For example, ACPI [7] devices that enter suspend (S3) or hibernation (S4) states could provide a measured event indicating this transition. Table 8 defines the structure of event data for this type of CEL Management Event TPMS_STATE_TRANS.

Table 8 TPMI_STATE_TRANS

NAME	VALUE	DESCRIPTION
suspend	0	System suspending
hibernate	1	System is hibernating
kexec	2	System is kexec'ing a new kernel

 © TCG 2025

4.5 PCCLIENT_STD Event Types

A PCCLIENT_STD Event consists of a type and, depending on the type, it might contain additional information. Some of these Events are measured into a PCR whilst others are not, as specified in the TCG PC-Client Firmware Profile Specification[2]. For this specification, PCCLIENTR_STD events SHALL be encapsulated into two fields as defined in Table 9. Detailed informative examples of this encapsulation for different encodings are given in section 5. PCCLIENT_STD event types are defined in TCG_PCR_EVENT2 structure in TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification [2].

Table 9 defines the content of a PC-Client STD Event TPMS_EVENT_PCCLIENT_STD.

Table 9 TPMS_EVENT_PCCLIENT_STD

TYPE	FIELD	VALUE	DESCRIPTION
TPMI_PC_CLIENT_EVENTS	event_type	0	The type of PC-Client Event
BYTEBUFFER	event_data	1	The data of this PC-Client Event

TPMI_PC_CLIENT_EVENTS is the Event type as specified in [2], Table 9, where the Event type can be either the UINT32 representation or the string representation defined in TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification [2], Table 9.

“BYTEBUFFER” is a field comprising a length delimited set of bytes. The exact specification of such fields can be different for each encoding, and are given for CBOR, TLV and JSON in section 5.

4.6 IMA_TEMPLATE Event Types

An IMA_TEMPLATE Event comprises a template name and template data. The content of the template data is measured into a PCR. The format of the template data depends on the template name. The names and format of the Event data are specified in the IMA specification [5].

Table 10 defines the content of an IMA_TEMPLATE Event. The contents of these fields are defined in [5], and the raw values are encapsulated from the original log data as shown in the informative examples of this encapsulation in section 5.1.6.

Table 10 TPMS_EVENT_IMA_TEMPLATE

TYPE	FIELD	VALUE	DESCRIPTION
String	template_name	0	The type of IMA event
BYTEBUFFER	template_data	1	The data of this IMA event

4.7 IMA_TLV Event Types

The IMA_TLV content type is a Linux Event format that is fully compatible with this specification’s Information Model and TLV encoding. The data sub fields within the IMA_TLV content field are not specified in this document. Informative examples are given in section 5. Section 6 provides an informative list of the IMA_TLV content subfield types.

4.8 SYSTEMD Event Type

The SYSTEMD [9] event data consists of the raw string field as provided by systemd’s journal or TPM Event Log.

 © TCG 2025

5 Canonical Event Log Encodings (CEL-EN)

Canonical Event Logs SHALL use the information model described in section 4. If Canonical Event Logs use TLV, CBOR, or JSON encodings, they SHALL follow the encoding specifications in this section.

1) Encodings SHALL maintain the coherence of the CEL Fields within a CEL Record (CELR)
2) Encodings SHALL either use key value maps to represent TPMS_ structures or ordered lists (arrays) if key value maps are not supported. The order of these lists SHALL follow the order of the rows in the tables in section 4.
3) Encodings SHALL use the tag values defined in the enumeration defining tables (Tables 1 – 7 above) if the encodings do not support text-based enumeration values.
4) If encodings support several byte orders the encodings SHOULD use network byte order.
5) The data type definitions in this specification use the data types from the TPM Library Specification [1]. Encodings SHALL include the specified data types and their referenced TPM data types accordingly, down to the base data type definitions of the TPM library specification.

5.1 Canonical Event Log Record Encoding – TLV (CEL-TLV)

In the TLV encoding, every element of a log entry is a Type-Length-Value (TLV) triple (3-tuple) that is defined in Table 11. Figure 1 shows the format of a complete CELR in TLV format, with the four required fields in TLV format.

Table 11 TLV Encoding

<T,L,V> Triple	Size / Type
T	8-bit
L	32-bit, unsigned integer, Network Byte Order = Big-Endian
V	L bytes/octets




Figure 1 A Canonical Event Log Record in TLV Format

 © TCG 2025

5.1.1 CEL_RECNUM TLV

The CEL record number field is encoded in a TLV of type RECNUM (Table 12).

Table 12 Record Number

<RECNUM> TLV		
T	recnum = 0	From Information Model table 1
L	The length in bytes/octets of the value (V). As the value (V) is a sequential number and since the format is TLV, the length (L) could vary while the log advances. For instance, with a length of 1 (= 1 byte), up to 255 values can be used. After the 255th entry, the length (L) can be increased to 2, giving enough space for storing 65535 values/numbers. After that, the length can increase to 3, and so on. This specification fixes the size of L to 4 bytes, as specified in table 8.	
V	The value is the sequential number (an unsigned integer) with the length (L), in network byte order.	

5.1.2 CEL_PCR_NVINDEX TLV

The CEL PCR or NV Index field is encoded in a TLV as shown in Table 13.

Table 13 PCR or NV Index Field

<PCR> TLV		
T	pcr = 1, nv_index = 2	Indicates a PCR or NV index
L	The length in bytes/octets of the value (V). The length (L) can vary: e.g., with a length of 1 (= 1 byte) 255 PCRs can be differentiated. Larger PCR numbers need a larger length (L). This specification fixes the size of L to 4 bytes as specified in table 11.	
V	The PCR number (unsigned integer) in network byte order	

5.1.3 CEL_DIGESTS TLV

The CEL digest field TLV is nested, with one or more sub-TLV for each bank's digest, as shown in Table 14.

Table 14 Digests encoding

<DIGEST> TLV				
T		Digest = 3	From Information Model table 1	
L		Length of the entire digest content value 'V'	network byte order	
V		One or more following digest TLV		
	T	SHA1	4	From TPML_DIGEST_VALUES
		SHA256	11	
		SHA384	12	
		SHA512	13	

 © TCG 2025

		SM3	18	
	L		The length of the digest indicated by T	
	V		The digest of the type indicated by T and the length indicated by L	

5.1.4 CEL_CONTENT TLV

The CEL Event Content field is encoded in a TLV as shown in Table 15.

Table 15 Content encoding

<CONTENT> TLV			
T	CEL	4	Management Content Type from Information Model Table 2
	PCCLIENT_STD	5	PC Client WG defined encapsulated structure [2]
	IMA_TEMPLATE	7	Linux IMA_TEMPLATE format [5]
	IMA_TLV	8	IMA directly stored in CEL-TLV format
	SYSTEMD	9	Systemd events encapsulated in CEL-TLV
L			The length of the value (V) network byte order
V			The value, according to the type (T)

5.1.5 IMA_TLV Content Layer

IMA_TLV is a Linux kernel measurement content layer, in which IMA [5] records are stored directly in CEL format with TLV encoding using existing fields of the TCG Canonical Event Log Record Information Model (CEL_IM) and TLV Encoding. In IMA_TLV, the digest field values are hashes across the entire content field TLV data, thus simplifying the verification, while protecting all the type and length and value information in the field's TLV and nested TLV's. The IMA-TLV content subtypes are specified in IMA [5]. The overall format is shown in figure 2.




Figure 2: IMA_TLV encoding

 © TCG 2025

A Linux CEL-TLV-IMA content field is a nested TLV with the top-level type IMA_TLV from table 2, containing one or more CEL-TLV-IMA content fields, as shown in Table 16.

Table 16 IMA_TLV Content Encoding

IMA_TLV		
T	IMA_TLV_CONTENT_PATH (0)	full pathname of the file
	IMA_TLV_CONTENT_DATAHASH (1)	The hash over the file content.
	IMA_TLV_CONTENT_DATASIG (2)	A file signature in IMA format, which includes type and keyid.
	IMA_TLV_CONTENT_OWNER (3)	File owner (uid)
	IMA_TLV_CONTENT_GROUP (4)	File group (gid)
	IMA_TLV_CONTENT_MODE (5)	Linux uint16 bitmask of the file permission bits
	IMA_TLV_CONTENT_TIMESTAMP (6)	Linux time_t file creation/modification time
	IMA_TLV_CONTENT_LABEL (7)	LSM security label on the file (e.g., selinux label)
L	The length of the value (V).	
V	The value (V) containing data of the type (T).	

Start of informative comment

```
The following is a hex/ascii dump of one CELR in the CEL-IMA-TLV format. The dump is
repeated, with each TLV formatted CEL field highlighted and explained.

00000000  00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00  01 01 00 00 00 04 00 00  |................|
00000010  00 0a 03 00 00 00 19 04  00 00 00 14 4b 47 65 fa  |............KGe.|
00000020  62 21 a2 c6 d6 d2 a2 7c  5c e9 22 df b8 93 e9 3f  |b!.....|\."....?|
00000030  08 00 00 00 26 00 00 00  00 08 2f 62 69 6e 2f 66  |....&...../bin/f|
00000040  6f 6f 01 00 00 00 14 00  01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08  |oo..............|
00000050  09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10  11 12 13                 |...........|
Field '0' (SEQNUM), Length 4, value 00000001


00000000  00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00  01 01 00 00 00 04 00 00  |................|
00000010  00 0a 03 00 00 00 19 04  00 00 00 14 4b 47 65 fa  |............KGe.|
00000020  62 21 a2 c6 d6 d2 a2 7c  5c e9 22 df b8 93 e9 3f  |b!.....|\."....?|
00000030  08 00 00 00 26 00 00 00  00 08 2f 62 69 6e 2f 66  |....&...../bin/f|
00000040  6f 6f 01 00 00 00 14 00  01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08  |oo..............|
00000050  09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10  11 12 13                 |...........|
Field '1' (PCRNUM) length 4, value 10 (decimal)


00000000  00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00  01 01 00 00 00 04 00 00  |................|
00000010  00 0a 03 00 00 00 19 04  00 00 00 14 4b 47 65 fa  |............KGe.|
00000020  62 21 a2 c6 d6 d2 a2 7c  5c e9 22 df b8 93 e9 3f  |b!.....|\."....?|
00000030  08 00 00 00 26 00 00 00  00 08 2f 62 69 6e 2f 66  |....&...../bin/f|
00000040  6f 6f 01 00 00 00 14 00  01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08  |oo..............|
00000050  09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10  11 12 13                 |...........|
Field '3' (Digest), Length 25,
Nested TLV, type '04' (SHA1) 20 bytes, 4B4765FA6221A2C6D6D2A27C5CE922DFB893E93F
```

 © TCG 2025

```
(The following is the digest of the entire following content TLV (bytes 07..13)

00000000  00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00  01 01 00 00 00 04 00 00  |................|
00000010  00 0a 03 00 00 00 19 04  00 00 00 14 4b 47 65 fa  |............KGe.|
00000020  62 21 a2 c6 d6 d2 a2 7c  5c e9 22 df b8 93 e9 3f  |b!.....|\."....?|
00000030  08 00 00 00 26 00 00 00  00 08 2f 62 69 6e 2f 66  |....&...../bin/f|
00000040  6f 6f 01 00 00 00 14 00  01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08  |oo..............|
00000050  09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10  11 12 13                 |...........|
Field '8' (IMA-TLV content), length 38 bytes. This has two nested IMA-TLV contents:
IMA Type '00' (Path) Length 8, value "/bin/foo" and
IMA Type '01' (datahash), length 20, value bytes 00 01…12 13.
```

End of informative comment

5.1.6 IMA_TEMPLATE Content Layer

The existing IMA_TEMPLATE log [5] uses a named "template" to specify the content format. This section specifies CEL-TLV encapsulation of records from the "ima-ng" template native format, which includes "d-ng" (file-hash) and "n-ng" (filename) fields.

Start of informative comment

```
"ima-ng" is a binary format with records of:

      [uint32 little endian pcr]
      [20 digest]
      [uint32 little endian template name len = 6]
            [template name = "ima-ng" not null terminated]
      [uint32 little endian rec len]
            d-ng: [uint32 little endian hash len]*
                  [hash id - e.g., "sha1:" null terminated]*
                  [file hash]*
            n-ng: [uint32 little endian path len]*
                  [path - null terminated]*

For example, the following is a hexdump of the first two records in an actual native log:

00000000  0a 00 00 00 2d 92 56 f5  92 9d 55 13 16 09 ff 7c  |....-.V...U....||
00000010  3f 44 b9 ab b6 8a 30 ee  06 00 00 00 69 6d 61 2d  |?D....0.....ima-|
00000020  6e 67 31 00 00 00 1a 00  00 00 73 68 61 31 3a 00  |ng1.......sha1:.|
00000030  5b e8 d5 1b fe af 79 f2  ff 71 41 17 1a b7 a5 d3  |[.....y..qA.....|
00000040  3c 93 8c fc 0f 00 00 00  62 6f 6f 74 5f 61 67 67  |<.......boot_agg|
00000050  72 65 67 61 74 65 00 0a  00 00 00 46 80 a2 18 f5  |regate.....F....|
00000060  20 ce b0 9a c5 2e 8b 61  c8 12 c2 50 5e 2f 67 06  | ......a...P^/g.|
00000070  00 00 00 69 6d 61 2d 6e  67 49 00 00 00 28 00 00  |...ima-ngI...(..|
00000080  00 73 68 61 32 35 36 3a  00 64 a9 81 99 bc 62 58  |.sha256:.d....bX|
00000090  82 15 81 2b 55 c1 24 34  e7 a2 61 f7 b6 ed 93 ea  |...+U.$4..a.....|
000000a0  58 0d 0d 5c 9a ea eb 2d  9c 19 00 00 00 2f 75 73  |X..\...-...../us|
000000b0  72 2f 6c 69 62 2f 73 79  73 74 65 6d 64 2f 73 79  |r/lib/systemd/sy|
000000c0  73 74 65 6d 64 00

This log contains two records: the first is the special "boot_aggregate" event, in which
IMA hashes together PCRS 0-7. The second record, highlighted in yellow, can be parsed as:
```

 © TCG 2025

```
[uint32 little endian pcr]                  0x0a
[20 digest]                                 46 80 ... 2f 67          <-----------|
[uint32 little endian template name len]    0x06                                  |
    [template name]                         "ima-ng"                              |
[uint32 little endian rec len]              0x49                                  |
    d-ng:[uint32 little endian hash len]*   0x28                               ->|
         ["id:"]*                           "sha256:\0"                        ->|
         [file hash]*                       64 a9 ... 2d 9c                    ->|
    n-ng:[uint32 little endian path len]*   0x19                               ->|
         [path]*                            "/usr/lib/systemd/systemd\0'       ->|


The digest is of the record data (marked with '*' above):
28 00 00 00 73 68 61 32 35 36 3a 00 64 a9 81 99 bc 62 58 82 15 81 2b 55 c1 24 34 e7
a2 61 f7 b6 ed 93 ea 58 0d 0d 5c 9a ea eb 2d 9c 19 00 00 00 2f 75 73 72 2f 6c 69 62
2f 73 79 73 74 65 6d 64 2f 73 79 73 74 65 6d 64 00

The sha1 of this binary data is:
      4680a218f520ceb09ac52e8b61c812c2505e2f67
which matches the given digest.

Note that, since the template name, template name length, and record length fields are
not hashed, the parser should use care in using the given values.
```

End of informative comment

In order to encapsulate IMA_TEMPLATE formatted Event Log Records in CEL_TLV format, add a record number, encapsulate the existing PCR number in TLV, encapsulate the digest(s) (nested), and then nest the template name TLV, and hashed content TLV, into a content TLV. This makes it simpler to hash the content sub-TLV for verification, because it is only slightly different from the nominal hashing of the entire content TLV. This encapsulation is shown in figure 3. The content TLVs SHALL use the type names or numbers as shown in figure 3. The encapsulation of IMA_TEMPLATE in CEL-TLV SHALL use the field names and values shown in figure 3.




Figure 3 Encapsulating IMA_TEMPLATE in CEL-TLV

 © TCG 2025

Start of informative comment

A program was written to translate binary ima-ng formatted logs into CEL-TLV-IMA-TEMPLATE formatted ones. Translating the above ima-ng example yields the following, with all TYPE bytes in yellow:

```
00000000  00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00  00 01 00 00 00 04 00 00  |................|
00000010  00 0a 03 00 00 00 19 04  00 00 00 14 2d 92 56 f5  |............-.V.|
00000020  92 9d 55 13 16 09 ff 7c  3f 44 b9 ab b6 8a 30 ee  |..U....|?D....0.|
00000030  07 00 00 00 41 00 00 00  00 06 69 6d 61 2d 6e 67  |....A.....ima-ng|
00000040  01 00 00 00 31 1a 00 00  00 73 68 61 31 3a 00 5b  |....1....sha1:.[|
00000050  e8 d5 1b fe af 79 f2 ff  71 41 17 1a b7 a5 d3 3c  |.....y..qA.....<|
00000060  93 8c fc 0f 00 00 00 62  6f 6f 74 5f 61 67 67 72  |.......boot_aggr|
00000070  65 67 61 74 65 00 00 00  00 00 04 00 00 00 01 01  |egate...........|
00000080  00 00 00 04 00 00 00 0a  03 00 00 00 19 04 00 00  |................|
00000090  00 14 46 80 a2 18 f5 20  ce b0 9a c5 2e 8b 61 c8  |..F.... ......a.|
000000a0  12 c2 50 5e 2f 67 07 00  00 00 59 00 00 00 00 06  |..P^/g....Y.....|
000000b0  69 6d 61 2d 6e 67 01 00  00 00 49 28 00 00 00 73  |ima-ng....I(...s|
000000c0  68 61 32 35 36 3a 00 64  a9 81 99 bc 62 58 82 15  |ha256:.d....bX..|
000000d0  81 2b 55 c1 24 34 e7 a2  61 f7 b6 ed 93 ea 58 0d  |.+U.$4..a.....X.|
000000e0  0d 5c 9a ea eb 2d 9c 19  00 00 00 2f 75 73 72 2f  |.\...-...../usr/|
000000f0  6c 69 62 2f 73 79 73 74  65 6d 64 2f 73 79 73 74  |lib/systemd/syst|
00000100  65 6d 64 00                                       |emd.|
```

tlv_dump parses and verifies this tlv encapsulated IMA TEMPLATE as:

```
SEQNUM 00000000
PCRNUM 10
DIGEST SHA1 2D9256F5929D55131609FF7C3F44B9ABB68A30EE
TEMPLATE NAME ima-ng
filesha1: 5BE8D51BFEAF79F2FF7141171AB7A5D33C938CFC
path: boot_aggregate
Digest matches content.

SEQNUM 00000001
PCRNUM 10
DIGEST SHA1 4680A218F520CEB09AC52E8B61C812C2505E2F67
TEMPLATE NAME ima-ng
filesha256: 64A98199BC62588215812B55C12434EA261F7B6ED93EA580D0D5C9AEAEB2D9C
path: /usr/lib/systemd/systemd
Digest matches content.
```

End of informative comment

5.1.7 PCCLIENT_STD Content Layer

Existing PCCLIENT records [2] are converted to TLV format in much the same way as IMA_TEMPLATE records were specified in section 5.1.6. The overall content is encapsulated in a TLV of type PCCLIENT_STD, which contains two nested TLV, one containing the uint32_t EventType, and one containing the EventContent, with the field values shown in figure 4.

Start of informative comment

 © TCG 2025

The only difference is that in the IMA_TEMPLATE case, all digests were produced by hashing the EventContent value directly. In the case of PCCLIENT_STD, this is true of some of the EventContents, but not all. For example, EV_NO_ACTION events are advisory only, and the digests (of all zeros) are not Extended. In EV_POST_CODE, the digests are of the code or data to be measured, and the digests are Extended into the specified PCR, but the Event content contains unverified hints or related information, and not the original data or hash. The TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification [2] contains the details of what is in the contents for all Event Types. While an attacker cannot change any of the record number, PCR, and Digest fields without detection by comparison to the actual PCR values, the attacker can freely change all the Event type fields and some of the Event content fields. Verifiers must not trust any unverified fields, which are included merely as hints.

End of informative comment

Figure 4 illustrates this encapsulation of the data from the log's native EVENT2 structure into a CEL-TLV encoding:




Figure 4 PCCLIENT encapsulation in CEL_TLV format

Start of informative comment

In more detail, the PCCLIENT event log consists of one EVENT-1 structure, followed by one or more Event-2 structures. The EVENT-1 structure is similar to the EVENT-2 shown but has a single fixed SHA-1 digest of 20 bytes, without the count or HashAlg fields.

```
event-1
   uint32_t    PCR_Index          //little-endian
   uint32_t    EventType          //little-endian
   uint8_t     sha1_digest[20]
   uint32_t    event_data_size    //little-endian
   uint8_t     data[]
event-2
   uint32_t    PCR_Index          //little-endian
   uint32_t    EventType          //little-endian
   uint32_t    digest_count
   uint16_t    digest1_alg        //little-endian
   uint8_t     digest1[]
   ...
   uint32_t    event_data_size    //little-endian
   uint8_t     data[]
```

 © TCG 2025

```
The following is a hexdump of the first two PCCLIENT records from an actual system,
with the first event highlighted in yellow:

00000000  00 00 00 00 03 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000010  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 25 00 00 00  |............%...|
00000020  53 70 65 63 20 49 44 20  45 76 65 6e 74 30 33 00  |Spec ID Event03.|
00000030  00 00 00 00 00 02 00 02  02 00 00 00 04 00 14 00  |................|
00000040  0b 00 20 00 00 00 00 00  00 08 00 00 00 02 00 00  |.. .............|
00000050  00 04 00 c4 2f ed ad 26  82 00 cb 1d 15 f9 78 41  |..../..&......xA|
00000060  c3 44 e7 9d ae 33 20 0b  00 d4 72 0b 40 09 43 82  |.D...3 ...r.@.C.|
00000070  13 b8 03 56 80 17 f9 03  09 3f 6b ea 8a b4 7d 28  |...V.....?k...}(|
00000080  3d b3 2b 6e ab ed bb f1  55 10 00 00 00 1e fb 6b  |=.+n....U......k|
00000090  54 0c 1d 55 40 a4 ad 4e  f4 bf 17 b8 3a

Event-1 (highlighted above in yellow):
         PCR:       00 00 00 00          // PCR0
         EventType  03 00 00 00          // 3 - EV_NO_ACTION
         Sha-1      00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
         Data size  25 00 00 00          // 37 bytes
         Data       53 70 … 20 00 00

Similarly, Event-2 is:
         PCR        00 00 00 00          // PCR 0
         EventType  08 00 00 00          // 8 - EV_S_CRTM_VERSION
         Dgstcount  02 00 00 00          // two digests
         Dgst1Alg   04 00                // 4 - sha1
         Dgst1      c4 2f ed … ae 33 20
         Dgst2Alg   0b 00                // sha256
         Dgst2      d4 72 0b …bb f1 55
         Datasize   10 00 00 00          // 16 bytes
         Data       1e fb 6b … 17 b8 3a

The following is a hexdump of the same events translated to PCCLIENT_STD format with the
first event highlighted in yellow:

00000000  00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00  00 01 00 00 00 04 00 00  |................|
00000010  00 00 03 00 00 00 19 04  00 00 00 14 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000020  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
00000030  05 00 00 00 33 00 00 00  00 04 00 00 00 03 01 00  |....3...........|
00000040  00 00 25 53 70 65 63 20  49 44 20 45 76 65 6e 74  |..%Spec ID Event|
00000050  30 33 00 00 00 00 00 00  02 00 02 02 00 00 00 04  |03..............|
00000060  00 14 00 0b 00 20 00 00  00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00  |..... ..........|
00000070  01 01 00 00 00 04 00 00  00 00 03 00 00 00 3e 04  |..............>.|
00000080  00 00 00 14 c4 2f ed ad  26 82 00 cb 1d 15 f9 78  |...../..&......x|
00000090  41 c3 44 e7 9d ae 33 20  0b 00 00 00 20 d4 72 0b  |A.D...3 .... .r.|
000000a0  40 09 43 82 13 b8 03 56  80 17 f9 03 09 3f 6b ea  |@.C....V.....?k.|
000000b0  8a b4 7d 28 3d b3 2b 6e  ab ed bb f1 55 05 00 00  |..}(=.+n....U...|
000000c0  00 1e 00 00 00 00 04 00  00 00 08 01 00 00 00 10  |................|
000000d0  1e fb 6b 54 0c 1d 55 40  a4 ad 4e f4 bf 17 b8 3a

Event 1 (highlighted above in yellow):
         T: 00  L: 00 00 00 04 V: 00 00 00 00          // SEQNUM 0
         T: 01  L: 00 00 00 04 V: 00 00 00 00          // PCRNUM 0
```

 © TCG 2025

```
         T: 03  L: 00 00 00 19 V: nested                // Digest header
                 T: 04 L: 00 00 00 14 V: 00 … 00        // sha-1, 16 zero bytes
         T: 05  L 00 00 00 33 V   nested
                 T: 00 L: 00 00 00 04 V: 00 00 00 03    // Event Type 3
                 T: 01 L: 00 00 00 25 V: 53 70 … 00 00 // Event Content 37 bytes

Tlv_dump parses and reports these as:

SEQNUM 0 PCRNUM 0 DIGESTS SHA1 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 PCCLIENT
 TYPE EV_NO_ACTION CONTENT 537065632049442045766 56E743033000000000000 2000202000
000040014000B00200000
SEQNUM 1 PCRNUM 0 DIGESTS SHA1 C42FEDAD268200CB1D15F97841C344E79DAE3320 SHA256 D
4720B4009438213B803568017F903093F6BEA8AB47D283DB32B6EABEDBBF155 PCCLIENT TYPE EV
_S_CRTM_VERSION CONTENT 1EFB6B540C1D5540A4AD4EF4BF17B83A SHA1 Matches content.
```

End of informative comment

5.1.8 CEL_MGT Content Layer

CEL_MGT is a simple record, defined directly in native TLV format. Figure 5 shows the format of this record.





Figure 5 CEL Management content in CEL_TLV

The CEL Management tag is ‘4’. Note that multiple management content fields can be in a single Log Record, as shown in Figure 5.

5.1.9 SYSTEMD Content Layer

Systemd Events comprise a simple ASCII string that is hashed and extended into a PCR. When encoded in TLV format, the content field uses the type SYSTEMD, and the value is simply the ASCII string. This encapsulation is shown in Figure 6.

 © TCG 2025



Systemd Journal Entry Fields	
ID	SD_MESSAGE_TPM_PCR_EXTEND_STR
MEASURING=	Content (char *) → 'V'
PCR=	PCR (char *) → "PCR"
BANKS	PCR banks (list in char *)

Figure 6. SYSTEMD Encapsulation for TLV.

Start of informative comment

Systemd events are logged in its binary journal files. These can be viewed with the journalctl tool or can be programmatically retrieved through the system library. When displayed with journalctl, an example event looks like:

Nov 28 15:19:04 fedora systemd-pcrphase[670]: Extended PCR index 15 with 'machine-id:e9642bb2ab6448408be3585ef997d962' (banks sha256).

In this example, the string "'machine-id:e9642bb2ab6448408be3585ef997d962" has been hashed and extended into the sha256 bank of PCR15. When translated to CEL-TLV format, this string is:

```
00000000  00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00  00 01 00 00 00 04 00 00  |................|
00000010  00 0f 03 00 00 00 25 0b  00 00 00 20 3b 3a 44 12  |......%.... ;:D.|
00000020  fc c6 bd 7d 8a 68 4d 8a  57 4d 6d a4 66 af 50 c2  |...}.hM.WMm.f.P.|
00000030  6e 6e 12 bb 61 43 b2 b9  e6 65 a3 b6 09 00 00 00  |nn..aC...e......|
00000040  2b 6d 61 63 68 69 6e 65  2d 69 64 3a 65 39 36 34  |+machine-id:e964|
00000050  32 62 62 32 61 62 36 34  34 38 34 30 38 62 65 33  |2bb2ab6448408be3|
00000060  35 38 35 65 66 39 39 37  64 39 36 32              |
```

The yellow highlighted bytes are the type fields for the recnum (0), pcr (1), digests (3), and systemd content (9).

End of informative comment

5.2 Canonical Event Log Encoding – CBOR and JSON CDDL

Start of informative comment

RFC 7049 defines a Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) format. RFC 8610 defines Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL), which can be used to specify CBOR encodings. CEL-JSON encoding is authoritatively specified in TCG TSS 2.0 JSON Data Types and Policy Language Specification [8]. This section provides the combined specifications for the CEL CBOR and JSON encodings. The CBOR encoding defines raw binary format for a Canonical Event Log that is compliant with this CEL specification, with content encapsulation using the same defined content types as in the TLV encodings in section 5.1. As the CDDL specification can be compiled into automated processing tools, informative examples, and diagrams of the CEL-CBOR format are not included in this document.

 © TCG 2025

Note that this section contains a complete specification for CEL-CBOR and for the encapsulated PCCLIENT and IMA content layers. This specification is not authoritative over the TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile [2] and TPM Algorithm Registry [3] definitions, and the relevant values are included in this CEL-CBOR specification for convenience only. The following CDDL contains comments on the indicated references that should be consulted for authoritative values.

End of informative comment

```
; Combined CBOR/JSON CDDL Specification for CEL

tcg-canonical-event-log = [ * TPMS_CEL_EVENT-choice ]

TPMS_CEL_EVENT-choice = &(
  TPMS_CEL_EVENT<CEL, TPMS_EVENT_CELMGT-choice>,
  TPMS_CEL_EVENT<PCCLIENT_STD, TPMS_EVENT_PCCLIENT_STD>,
  TPMS_CEL_EVENT<IMA_TEMPLATE, TPMS_EVENT_IMA_TEMPLATE>,
  TPMS_CEL_EVENT<IMA_TLV, BYTEBUFFER>,
  TPMS_CEL_EVENT<SYSTEMD, BYTEBUFFER>,
  * $TPMS_CEL_EVENT-extension,
)

TPMS_CEL_EVENT<T,C> = {
  recnum => uint,
  pcr-xor-nv-index,
  digests => TPML_DIGEST_VALUES,
  content_type => T,   ; from TPMI_CEL_CONTENT_TYPE
  content => C,        ; TPMU_EVENTCONTENT group choice
}

pcr-xor-nv-index //= ( pcr => 0x00000000..0x00FFFFFF )
pcr-xor-nv-index //= ( nv_index => 0x20000000..0x20FFFFFF )

TPML_DIGEST_VALUES = [ + TPMT_HA ]
TPMT_HA = {
  hashAlg => $TPMI_ALG_HASH, ; manually added below for completeness
  digest => BYTEBUFFER,
}

TPMS_EVENT_CELMGT-choice = &(
  TPMS_EVENT_CELMGT<CEL_VERSION, TPMS_CEL_VERSION>,
  TPMS_EVENT_CELMGT<CEL_TIMESTAMP, uint .size 8>,
  TPMS_EVENT_CELMGT<STATE_TRANS, $TPMI_STATE_TRANS>,
  { celmgt.type => FIRMWARE_END },
  * $$TPMS_EVENT_CELMGT-extensions,
)

TPMS_EVENT_CELMGT<T,D> = {
  celmgt.type => T,     ; from TPMI_CELMGTTYPE
  celmgt.data => D,     ; from TPMU_CELMGT
}

TPMS_CEL_VERSION = {
  major => uint .size 2,
  minor => uint .size 2,
}

$TPMI_STATE_TRANS /= Suspend
```

 © TCG 2025

```
$TPMI_STATE_TRANS /= Hibernate
$TPMI_STATE_TRANS /= Kexec

TPMS_EVENT_PCCLIENT_STD = {
  event_type => text / uint .size 4,
  event_data => BYTEBUFFER,
}

TPMS_EVENT_IMA_TEMPLATE = {
  template_name => text,
  template_data => BYTEBUFFER,
}

; labels start here

JSON-ONLY<J> = J .feature "json"
CBOR-ONLY<C> = C .feature "cbor"
JC<J,C> = JSON-ONLY<J> / CBOR-ONLY<C>

;; The following rules originate from TCG Algorithm Registry [3]
;; For convenience, the section below is extracted from
;; tcg-algorithm-registry_JSON.cddl.  This CDDL should be used
;; in conjunction with the original tcg-algorithm-registry.cddl.

$TPMI_ALG_HASH /= TPM_ALG_SHA
$TPMI_ALG_HASH /= TPM_ALG_SHA1
$TPMI_ALG_HASH /= TPM_ALG_SHA256
$TPMI_ALG_HASH /= TPM_ALG_SHA384
$TPMI_ALG_HASH /= TPM_ALG_SHA512
$TPMI_ALG_HASH /= TPM_ALG_SM3_256
$TPMI_ALG_HASH /= TPM_ALG_SHA3_256
$TPMI_ALG_HASH /= TPM_ALG_SHA3_384
$TPMI_ALG_HASH /= TPM_ALG_SHA3_512

TPM_ALG_SHA = JC<("sha" / "0x0004"), 0x0004>
TPM_ALG_SHA1 = JC<("sha1" / "0x0004"), 0x0004>
TPM_ALG_SHA256 = JC<("sha256" / "0x000B"), 0x000B>
TPM_ALG_SHA384 = JC<("sha384" / "0x000C"), 0x000C>
TPM_ALG_SHA512 = JC<("sha512" / "0x000D"), 0x000D>
TPM_ALG_SM3_256 = JC<("sm3_256" / "0x0012"), 0x0012>
TPM_ALG_SHA3_256 = JC<("sha3_256" / "0x0027"), 0x0027>
TPM_ALG_SHA3_384 = JC<("sha3_384" / "0x0028"), 0x0028>
TPM_ALG_SHA3_512 = JC<("sha3_512" / "0x0029"), 0x0029>

; JSON/CBOR labels and constants
recnum = JC<"recnum", 0>
pcr = JC<"pcr", 1>
nv_index = JC<"nv_index", 2>
digests = JC<"digests", 3>
CEL = JC<"cel", 4>
PCCLIENT_STD = JC<"pcclient_std", 5>
IMA_TEMPLATE = JC<"ima_template", 7>
IMA_TLV = JC<"ima_tlv", 8>
SYSTEMD = JC<"systemd", 9>
content_type = JC<"content_type", 9>
content = JC<"content", 10>
hashAlg = JC<"hashAlg", 0>
```

 © TCG 2025

```
digest = JC<"digest", 1>
celmgt.type = JC<"type", 0>
celmgt.data = JC<"data", 1>
CEL_VERSION = JC<"cel_version", 1>
FIRMWARE_END = JC<"firmware_end", 2>
CEL_TIMESTAMP = JC<"cel_timestamp", 80>
STATE_TRANS = JC<"state_trans", 81>
major = JC<"major", 0>
minor = JC<"minor", 1>
Suspend = JC<"suspend", 0>
Hibernate = JC<"hibernate", 1>
Kexec = JC<"kexec", 2>
event_type = JC<"event_type", 0>
event_data = JC<"event_data", 1>
template_name = JC<"template_name", 0>
template_data = JC<"template_data", 1>
BYTEBUFFER = JC<text, bytes>
```

 © TCG 2025

6 Defined types for all examples.

Start of informative comment

The following are C code definitions for the CEL-TLV and CEL-CBOR types used in the Examples in section 5.

```
/* TCG CEL Top Level Event Types */
#define CEL_SEQNUM                  0
#define CEL_PCR                     1
#define CEL_NV_INDEX                2
#define CEL_DIGESTS                 3
#define CEL_MGT                     4
#define CEL_PCCLIENT_STD            5
#define CEL_IMA_TEMPLATE            7
#define CEL_IMA_TLV                 8
#define CEL_SYSTEMD                 9

/* TCG TPM Digest Types */
#define TPM_ALG_SHA1                4
#define TPM_ALG_SHA256              11

/* CEL_MGT types
#define CEL_MGT_TYPE                    0
#define CEL_MGT_DATA                    1
#define CEL_MGT_CEL_VERSION             1
#define CEL_MGT_CEL_VERSION_MAJOR       0
#define CEL_MGT_CEL_VERSION_MINOR       1
#define CEL_MGT_FIRMWARE_END            2
#define CEL_MGT_CEL_TIMESTAMP           80
#define CEL_MGT_STATE_TRANS             81
#define CEL_MGT_STATE_TRANS_SUSPEND     0
#define CEL_MGT_STATE_TRANS_HIBERNATE   1
#define CEL_MGT_STATE_TRANS_KEXEC       2

/* IMA-TLV Specific Content Types */
#define IMA_TLV_PATH                0
#define IMA_TLV_DATAHASH            1
#define IMA_TLV_DATASIG             2
#define IMA_TLV_OWNER               3
#define IMA_TLV_GROUP               4
#define IMA_TLV_MODE                5
#define IMA_TLV_TIMESTAMP           6
#define IMA_TLV_LABEL               7

/* IMA_TEMPLATE Specific Content Types */
#define IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME           0
#define IMA_TEMPLATE_DATA           1

/* PCCLIENT_STD content types */
#define PCCLIENT_STD_TYPE           0
#define PCCLIENT_STD_CONTENT        1
```

End of informative comment

 © TCG 2025